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~~ TEAMERICANS HA YEA UNIQUE CULTURE. We champion openness W W ~ government but implement many policies in secret. Historically, we 
have been quick to fight for national honor but equally quick to publicly and 
mercilessly criticize ourselves; a future historian might even conclude that we 
defined our culture by airing dirty laundry. From the very beginning, we publicly 
debated our national morality-from slavery to the Indian campaigns; from 
Mexico to the Maine; from Vietnam to Panama. We even exposed "secret" 
executive actions by televising the introspective and painful investigations of such 
notable events as Iran,Contra and the Church Committee hearings. Probably 
more than any other nation in the world, we can expect that sooner or later 
virtually any executive activity of the United States will be publicly scrutinized. 
Executive Action 
Lacking precise definition, executive action has become a term of art that 
describes activities designed to influence behavior. Executive action often is 
"secret," but not always. If secret, it often is coercive. When practiced by the 
United States, it is always a tool of foreign, never domestic, policy. 
Covert Action the U.S. Way 
Executive action may be applied directly-by military or paramilitary force, 
economic leverage, or political activities-or it may consist of mere persuasion. 
Executive action may also be applied indirectly, for example by using 
surrogates, propaganda, or even covert military, economic, and political 
activities. Each of these techniques will be a focus, from time to time, for covert 
action. l 
Covert action practiced by the United States shares its cultural heritage 
with intelligence. A scant few decades ago, nations would tacitly concede, but 
rarely admit, the common practice of international intelligence gathering--of 
spying on other nations. The United States was no exception. 
Prior to World War II, the United States was, perhaps, the least experienced 
spy master of the developed nations.2 U.S. intelligence activities had been a 
desultory lot, sometimes favored, sometimes vilified, rarely admitted and 
always in jeopardy of extinction. Yet, at the end of World War II, we not only 
planned to continue into peacetime the intelligence institutions conceived in 
war, we also codified and published the intent. More recently, we undertook a 
similar catharsis with covert action. 
American Candor 
The National Security Act of 1947 was a mold for much of contemporary 
U.S. Government intelligence practice. A legislative behemoth originally 
devoted to overhauling the military establishment, the draft Act was seized 
upon as a handy tool by which to create the National Security Council, a 
Director of Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Each is 
an institution important enough, and certainly visible enough, to obscure what 
may be the most Significant aspect of the Act. By this peacetime legislation, the 
United States officially and publicly recognized intelligence gathering as a 
legitimate foreign policy process.3 
The Act was eloquent testimony to the belated acceptance by the United 
States of international intelligence gathering that included even reading other 
people's mai1.4 Perhaps even more significant, however, was the world 
reaction-or lack thereof. Global ennui eloquently testified to international 
acceptance of intelligence activities.5 
The 1947 Act did more, however. Just as the Act acknowledged a purpose 
to gather intelligence internationally, it also acknowledged-albeit 
obliquely-an acceptance of the necessity to engage in covert action. In 
understatement worthy of our British heritage, the Act required that the 
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. Central Intelligence Agency perform such other functions as the National 
Security Council might direct.6 
The meaning of that language in the 1947 Act might have been less than 
obvious at its creation, but four decades later it was clarified. By that point in 
history, it was probably unnecessary to clarify the fact that the U.S. engages in 
international covert action, but the clarification was, nevertheless, instructive. 
In 1991, in an era when the sovereignty of developing nations was at its 
emotional apex, the Congress of the United States once again did something 
that only a secure democracy could dare. Not unlike its 1947 legislative 
admission, Congress publicly confirmed its policy of peacetime covert action by 
amending the U.S. Code to more explicitly acknowledge covert action as U.S. 
policy.7 
Congress statutorily confirmed an acceptance of covert influence on the 
affairs of other nations. This easily was our most profound statement on U.S. 
willingness to mold other nations to our liking. It was also unusual candor in an 
era when proliferation of new nation,States elevated sovereign emotions to 
new heights.s Nevertheless, as with the 1947 legislation, not a ripple disturbed 
the surface of the nation,state system. 
U.S. Covert Action 
Because covert action amounts to interference with sovereign rights, 
nations always seek to distance themselves from the activity.9 The reason is 
axiomatic-covert actions inherently, and universally, are fractious political 
issues that flaunt a universal need for rules of international behavior. 
Nevertheless, from time to time, all nations find it necessary to cloak official 
processes from public view; certainly, that was never more true than during the 
era of the Cold War.10 Adversaries and ideology aside, the Cold War interest in 
avoiding nuclear conflict promoted a relatively high tolerance for covert action 
as well as understood "rules" for the genre. "Plausible deniability" was a key 
goal; indeed, in that bipolar world it became rule number one.l1 
Our limited experience with modem covert action originates primarily in 
World War nY Ours is a culture that easily tolerates covert actions as a 
daring,do adjunct to armed combat, but to surreptitiously influence (or 
change) other governments in peacetime is far more difficult for us to 
countenance. Not unlike our history of intelligence gathering, covert action 
has no luster in the United States-we simply don't like secrecy. We like to 
consider ourselves as ingenuous, open, and honest. We prefer to regard 
deviousness and secrecy as the product of evil empires. More importantly, we 
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believe strongly in a government of shared political power. Covert action, 
which definitionally restricts participatory activity, seems somehow 
antithetical to these ideals. 
Despite this cultural inhibition, covert action was "writ large" in the political 
environment of the post,War period. The fall of Nazism and the rise of 
communism ushered in an era of political tension, paranoia, economic 
distress-and nuclear terror. Covert actions seemed to be ideally suited to 
accomplish foreign policy goals without unacceptable risk of rekindling mnitary 
conflict. Prodded by Cold War fears, the number of covert actions multiplied. 
Communist insurgencies and communist,inspired political subversion had 
become ubiquitous reality during the tedious process of rebuilding, or building 
anew, from a war,ravaged world. Polarized political views, coupled with a 
tenuous peace, made traditional foreign policy slow and cumbersome in a 
fast,developing world. By contrast, covert action beckoned policy makers with 
a promise of swift, high,impact alternatives ideally suited for post,war 
containment policy. The result, observed Henry Kissinger, is that all Presidents 
since World War II "have felt a need for covert operations in the gray area 
between formal diplomacy and military intervention."l3 
Shielding the United States as well as the President from public scrutiny, 14 
even marginal success served to breed new covert actions. Knowledge of covert 
operations became so commonplace that the United States was accused of 
being responsible for nearly all internal difficulties worldwide. IS Not 
surprisingly, the American political consensus of the war years that had 
insulated intelligence and covert action from close scrutiny did not survive the 
advent of peace. 
Close scrutiny did not occur overnight, but when it started, it became an 
irresistible force. Covert actions begun under the OSS continued through the 
both formative and mature years of the CIA. Then, more plebeian domestic 
concerns related to U.S. intelligence activities focused legislative attention on 
covert activities as well. Our proclivity for participatory democracy prevailed; 
all "secret" foreign policy came up for debate, and covert action was no 
exception. Under the sharp scrutiny of Senator Frank Church, the intelligence 
community suffered the slings and arrows of what many might justifiably 
consider to have been righteous hindsight. 
Post,war domestic abuses of intelligence resources are a matter of history. 
Even so, most observers today will concede that many of the "abuses" are more 
clearly perceived as such when seen through the eyes of the citizen of the 1970s 
than through the eyes of citizens of the 1930s, 40s, or 50s, when the relevant 
activities were initiated. The interim years had elevated personal privacy rights 
4 
M.E.Bowman 
to pedestal heights and sharpened the analysis of Constitutional guarantees 
against government intrusion. As each passing day made it less likely that 
communism would absorb the United States, apocalyptic post,war fears 
receded to focus on more personal concerns. Tolerance for "Big Brother" 
decreased, and government increasingly was put on a tighter leash. 
In this climate, the Church Committee began its well, known probe of 
United States' intelligence activity. It inquired, inter alia, into the scope of U.S . 
covert action, its value, its techniques, and its necessity.16 It questioned 
whether covert action had become a substitute for decision, making, whether a 
covert capability should be maintained, and, if so, whether it should remain in 
the CIA. 
The Committee pointedly concluded its analysis with the observation that 
covert action was not included in the CIA charter (the National Security Act of 
1947), but conceded that the Act had a savings clause to provide for 
contingencies. Specifically, the Act empowered the CIA to "perform such 
other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security 
as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.,,17 Relying on 
this clause, the National Security Council did issue a series of directives 
specifying the CIA's covert mission. IS Then came the invasion of South Korea. 
As with Germany, World War II's end left Korea divided into spheres of 
influence. The Soviets controlled the North and the United States the South. 
Unlike the European experience, however, both powers withdrew, leaving the 
Koreans to settle their own quarrels. The result was a conflagration that 
threatened bipolar stalemate. In this situation, covert operations seemed 
especially desirable. 
With modest beginnings in Korea, covert operations quickly supplied their 
own justification. By 1953, moderate successes in Korea had prompted the 
authorization of covert operations in forty,eight countries.19 As covert 
capability matured and expanded, it became necessary to create within the 
CIA the Directorate for Plans (DDP) to absorb and make more efficient the 
covert action capability.20 This was not merely a matter of efficiency. 
Organizing the DDP reflected concern for the expansive interest shown by the 
Soviet Union in the Third World and a felt need to combat that interest. 
Covert actions of this era were extensive, varied, and expensive-and 
wholly Executive in origin. All were undertaken pursuant to the inherent, 
albeit nebulous, Constitutional authority of the President. There is room, of 
course, for traditional legislative/executive debate over the Constitutional 
authority to authorize covert action, but, at least in that period of our history, it 
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is quite likely that Congress wanted no part of the covert operations tar baby. 
Senator Leverett Saltonstall explained Congressional inactivity this way: 
It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us ... 
it is a question of our reluctance ... to seek information ... on subjects which I 
personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have .... 21 
Legislative Initiatives 
Not until 1974 did Congress seriously begin to consider a role for itself in 
covert operations. Up to that time, the only outlet for Congressional concerns 
over covert action had been the traditional briefing process, but the expansive 
growth of covert actions soon proved this to be inadequate. According to one 
of the modem architects of covert action, Clark Clifford, the use of covert 
action had become a primary official activity which simply had "gotten out of 
hand."22 Congressional remediation, equally traditional, was legislation. 
Frustrated generally by lack of knowledge,23 and specifically by massive 
covert operations (and expenditures) in Peru, Congress amended the Foreign 
Assistance Act to deny expenditures for covert operations unless, a 
Presidential finding of importance to the national security preceded the 
operation.24 The Hughes,Ryan Amendment also mandated a reporting 
requirement and increased the number of committees to be informed of covert 
actions. It was, to be sure, watershed legislation, but for many it was simply too 
little too late. In the final analysis, the Amendment was ineffective because it 
lacked teeth; nevertheless, Congress had thrown down a marker. 
Soon thereafter, a long,smoldering conflict between Nicaragua and 
Honduras erupted. Politically, the United States looked with disfavor on the 
Nicaraguan regime and adopted a policy of supporting Honduras, or, more 
accurately, of opposing Nicaragua. U.S. actions in support of Contra guerrillas 
were both overt and covert, each prompting substantial criticism and venting 
emotions not unlike those of the Vietnam era. One result was an amendment 
to the 1983 Defense Appropriations Bill designed to end all aid to the 
Contras.25 Originally a classified addition to the 1983 Intelligence 
Authorization Act, the Boland Amendment restricted the use of appropriated 
funds to overthrow the Sandinista government and limited CIA covert 
operations to the interdiction of Nicaraguan arms supplies. 
Of course, the Boland Amendment accomplished neither goal. Of little 
more substantive effect than the Hughes,Ryan amendment, yet another spark 
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was required to rekindle Congressional scrutiny and to prompt an oversight 
role. Two were quickly forthcoming. 
The first catalyst was a second legislative "fix," dubbed Boland II. This 
legislation prohibited military or paramilitary support for the Contras by the 
CIA, DoD, "or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities.,,26 
The net result, according to Bud McFarlane, National Security Advisor, was to 
transfer the responsibility to the National Security Council staff, because "The 
President had made it clear that he wanted a job done."27 The "job," 
unfortunately, would include an ineptly conceived plan to interrupt commerce 
by mining Nicaraguan harbors. It was a covert action that quickly lost its 
covertness in implementation. 
This "covert" action prompted an international outcry,zs as well as adverse 
international legal opinion.29 Worse, however, was the domestic controversy. 
The Nicaraguan mining affair resulted in truly vitriolic debates over covert 
action, with the predictable result of diminishing public acceptance for the 
tactic. 
Kindling even greater consternation, however, was the second spark-the 
Iran,Contra affair. Executive Order 12,333 vested in the CIA exclusive 
jurisdiction over "special activities," a euphemism for covert action, "unless the 
President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular 
objective.,,3o At the time of drafting, it was generally assumed that the "other 
agency" would be the Department of Defense, but the vagueness of the 
language permitted the White House itself, through the NSC staff, to engage 
directly in a covert action, with disastrous results.31 . 
After this disgrace, covert action acquired something of a pariah status. In 
the wake of "Iran, Contra" and Nicaraguan mining, covert action translated as 
"dirty tricks," somehow antithetical to the "American way." American 
reluctance to countenance either government secrecy or official failure was 
reinforced and the undesirable nature of covert action seemingly confirmed.32 
The result of national anguish over these "failures," not necessarily wise, not 
necessarily unwise, was new legislation that defined covert action.33 It was not 
definition that Congress sought, however, but rather a threefold means of 
gaining limited procedural control and limited oversight of covert action. First, 
it sought to gain more timely information from the President concerning 
Executive intent to implement covert actions. Second, Congress intended to 
limit the ability of the President to avoid accountability to Congress with 
"plausible deniability.,,34 Finally, Congress decided to opt for a very a limited 
measure of fiscal control over the broad Executive authority to authorize a 
covert action. 
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The implementation of these procedures includes oversight authority vested 
in the intelligence committees. Importantly, the legislation prohibits 
authorization of a covert action, or expenditure of appropriated funds for one, 
unless the President first makes a written finding, specifying the action arm of 
government, that the activity is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy 
objectives, and that it is important to the national security.35 It further requires 
that the intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed.36 
Covert Action: The Congressional View 
A commonly accepted, though noninclusive, list of covert actions and, 
presumably, of "special activities" is propaganda,37 political action,38 
paramilitary operations,39 coup d'etat, and intelligence support.40 Whatever it 
might include, the legislation clearly rejects the definition of "special activities" 
found in Executive Order 12333.41 The reason for the rejection, however, is 
marginally helpful. 
The drafters intended to exclude the over,broad concept of foreign policy 
interests from their definition of "covert action." The vast reach of foreign 
policy simply makes it necessary to negate that frame of reference. The clear 
intent was to create an imprecise but manageable definition that would limit 
reporting only to a class of activities that the drafters believed should be 
brought to their attention. 
Neither the statute nor the statutory history cogently defines the activities 
included in the concept of events designed to influence political, economic, or 
military conditions abroad. That, however, is inherently rational. An 
excessively rigid statute easily could eliminate altogether any capability for 
covert action by levying conditions that would make secrecy implausible or by 
demanding too much prior definition of operations that require flexibility and 
decision, making in the field. 
Recognizing the "easier said than done" nature of their effort, Congress set 
about to define by exclusion the scope of their interest in covert action. The 
statute, and most of the legislative history, focus on what covert action is not.42 
To oversimplify, excluded from Congressional oversight are the traditional 
activities of the military, the intelligence community, diplomats and law 
enforcement officers. Remaining to be included, therefore, are covert 
paramilitary operations, propaganda, and covert political activities-and 




The statutory history makes clear that "covert action" is intended to include 
even nonattributable efforts in support of a noncovert activity. The sine qua 
non of a covert action, however, is not secrecy, whether in whole or in part, but 
rather plausible deniability. If plausible deniability is not viable, or if it is not to 
be claimed, the activity undertaken simply is not a covert action. Therefore, 
even "activities undertaken in secret but where the role of the United States 
will be disclosed or acknowledged once such activities take place are not covert 
actions."43 
Covert Action in Practice 
The practical problem, however, is more subtle than mere secrecy and 
deniability. Chicken and egg issues are a natural concomitant of covert action. 
Frequently it is impossible logically to differentiate between covert actions and 
exempted activities. Payments for intelligence acquisition may strengthen the 
coffers of dissident groups sufficiently to mount a successful revolution. Is the 
purpose to gain intelligence or to influence events? The two have very different 
legislative consequences. Support given to local intelllgence or police 
organizations might have the effect of neutralizing hostile intelligence services, 
but also of gaining valuable intelligence information. Which is the collateral 
effect? Does the potential for an unintended consequence trigger reporting?44 
Similarly quixotic is the distinction between forceful and non,forceful 
intervention. No longer defined merely by territorial integrity, international 
stability now rests on myriad complex and intangible features. In tum, this 
means that covert action, with its undercurrent of manipulation, easily can tip 
the fine balance of national and international perceptions and fears. A covert 
operation to support paramilitary forces may have the effect of influencing 
political programs; but just as likely, support for political programs may 
promote esteem for dissident paramilitary organizations. The natural effect of 
foreign policy, whether covert or overt, and regardless of the use of force, may 
be lowering the threshold for what will be perceived as unacceptable 
intervention. 
Despite the risks, the United States' experience in this century seems to 
confirm a national self,interest in maintaining a covert action capability. It is as 
true today as ever in history that a covert action adjunct of foreign policy 
remains necessary. It is also true, however, that covert operations come with an 
ever,increasing cost. Inaptly applied, covert action can be a damaging 
instrument. Unfortunately, covert action and plausible deniability can be 
seductive. 
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Secrecy gives the covert enterprise a poignant emphasis. Absent the glare of 
sunlight and the public impact of overt force, covert action easily can become a 
beguiling adventure. History indicates that policy makers sometimes find it an 
irresistible temptation to opt for covert action in lieu, rather than in support, of 
foreign policy.45 Used as a knee,jerk substitute for policy, it is rarely effective; 
more importantly, the failure of a covert option puts the option at risk for the 
future. Used properly, covert actions may serve national and even 
international needs. 
The Balance 
Therein lies the legislative purpose. Although the precise authority for 
covert action is debatable, it is clear that both the Congress and the Executive 
believe it a necessary option. Both presume that legal authority exists to engage 
in covert action and each presumes to have a Constitutionally authorized, if 
not precisely defined, role. 
The legal authorities for covert action were discussed in the Church 
Committee's Final Report, without closure, and continue to be debated today. 
In asserting its current role, Congress legislatively created procedural 
requirements precedent to the Executive authOrizing covert action. The 
laudable intent was to ensure coherent policy, but it is a goal that requires 
surgical skill. The reasons for this are threefold. 
1) Secrecy: Although covert action is generally acknowledged to be a 
valuable tool of statecraft, it is a limited tool, wholly dependent on an 
acceptable measure of secrecy. A failure of secrecy risks the foreign policy to 
which the covert action is dedicated, exposes national warts, and, in the 
extreme, may leave only the distressing options of withdrawal or overt military 
intervention. Painful experience demonstrates that secrecy is as perishable as it 
is necessary. The concomitant of secrecy likewise is threefold. 
a) Need to know: To maintain secrecy, it follows that operational 
knowledge must be narrowly restricted. Removing knowledge from the 
effective controls of the Executive, and committing it to the less constrained 
legislature, puts the enterprise and those involved at additional risk. That does 
not mean the risk is unreasonable, merely that it exists.46 
b) Reasonable scope: Perhaps more important is the barnyard bromide 
that one shouldn't bite off more than one can chew. Covert actions must be of a 
sufficiently limited scope and duration that they can be accomplished within 
the parameters of secrecy. History demonstrates that overly ambitious 
undertakings are likely to lose their mantle of secrecy. 
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c) Practical benefit: There is a practical side to secrecy as well. Normally, 
secrecy will be required to ensure the safety of persons involved. Not 
infrequently, secrecy is required to preserve the covert option for a repetitive, 
future use. Sometimes it is even useful to take advantage of an opportunity to 
cast another in the role of unscrupulous actor.47 
2) Plausible deniability: Unlike clandestine operations, which are intended not 
to be known at all, covert operations generally are known, but the national actors 
remain invisible. The reason for this essential feature harkens to concepts of both 
sovereignty and diplomacy. The nation~state system that grew out of the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648) hinges on sovereign inviolability, for lack of which 
international instability historically has been the result. However, nations do 
interfere with the internal affairs of other nations; therefore, a means of 
preserving stability despite interference with sovereign rights is required. 
To lessen the risk of war or political polarization of states, the ability of the 
actor to disclaim responsibility, and of the affected nation to disclaim knowledge, 
is a necessary charade. Without plausible deniability, nations would be forced 
into humiliating political retreat and to curtail, or even sever, diplomatic ties in 
the face of a sovereign affront. At the extremes, even war can result. 
3) Political Judgment: Finally, the most subjective and least manageable 
problem associated with shared Constitutional powers is the exercise of shared 
political judgment.48 The real question is not whether both the executive and 
the legislative branches of government have a role in foreign policy; rather, it is 
how each may fulfill its perceived role without bringing to fruition the very real 
problem of interfering with the other. 
Legislation is inherently inflexible and slow to be displaced, even when 
national needs change. Executive decision~making capability can be prompted, 
for good or bad, by the exigencies of the moment. Cutting Solomon's baby in 
half, we should expect that legislation affecting covert action, properly 
considered, would (1) slow impulse, but not impede decision~making, with 
procedural rather than substantive requirements; (2) promote executive 
decision~making that takes into account popular will, and, (3) permit the 
Executive to remain sufficiently flexible to meet changing or novel 
circumstances. Objectively, the Congressional attempt to control covert 
action seems to meet these goals. 
A Potent Option 
By any standard, covert action is less offensive than overt intervention, but 
it remains politically risky.49 Such are the sensitivities of nations that today 
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even economic or political coercion may be viewed with the same jaundiced 
eye as the world once viewed physical intervention.5o This will certainly be the 
case as the tensions of the Cold War continue to dissipate. With the world less 
concerned about global conflict, intrusive behavior that once might have been 
tolerated as anemic warfare, or justified as a measure of extra,legal justice, will 
become less acceptable. Nevertheless, just as overt but coercive diplomatic and 
economic activities will be tolerated, even if condemned, so will covert actions. 
There are limits, however, beyond which the American public will not 
countenance covert action and both the executive and legislative branches of 
government must know and respect those limits. The bottom line is that the 
President cannot, without repercussion, engage in a covert action that the 
people would not approve were they to know of the facts and circumstances. The 
Congress, without covert action capabilities itself, has chosen to serve as the 
people's overseer. 
With what is hopefully the wisdom of Solomon, both the executive and 
legislative branches publicly acknowledge a willingness to engage in covert 
action. The world knows, ifit cares to know, that the U.S. is willing to interfere 
in the internal affairs of other sovereigns. It knows also that Congressional 
involvement negates the probability, if not the possibility, of a rogue executive. 
Finally, the world also must presume that the American citizenry would, if it 
could be fully informed, approve the covert actions undertaken. 
What makes the United States unique is that we dislike the fundamentals of 
our own policy. We take national pride in promoting self,determination, public 
disclosure, and public diplomacy. We dislike secrecy. We dislike covert action. 
Still, despite our moralistic foundation, we sidestep Westphalian 
sovereignty and acknowledge a commitment to secret foreign policy. Even we 
find it anomalous that we will interfere with the internal affairs of other 
nations. But ours is, after all, a unique culture. 
Notes 
1. During the 1950's, when covert action was a growing business, it included "political and 
economic actions, propaganda, and paramilitary activities, ... planned and executed ..• to 
conceal the identity of the sponsor or else to permit the sponsor's plausible denial of the action." 
See, e.g., U.S. SENATE, I FINAL REpORT OF THE SELECf COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT 
OPERATIONS WITH REsPECf TO INTELliGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), at 
540 (hereinafter FINAL REpORT). The meaning is largely unchanged today. 
2. The United States is not without a history of intelligence activities. Indeed, it has a rich 
history, but a checkered one, not favored with continuity until recently. See STEPHEN KNOrr, 
SECRET AND SANCTIONED (1996); G.].A. OTOOLE, HONORABLE TREACHERY (1991); 
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Edward Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the u.s. Intelligence Community, INT'L J. 
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Spring 1986, at 1. 
3. 50 U.S.C. §401 et seq.; See also M. LOWENTHAL, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY: ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY 2 (Congressional Research Service Rep. No. 78-168F, 
1978). 
4. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 ("United States Intelligence 
Activities," (1981), § 1.11 (b». That Order, as did its predecessors, publicly assigns to the 
National Security Agency (NSA) responsibility to establish and operate a unified signals 
intelligence operation to control, collect, process, and disseminate signals intelligence for 
national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; in essence, to read the communications of 
other nations. 
5. See generally M.E. Bowman, Intelligence and International Law, INT'L J. INTELLIGENCE 
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Fall 1995, at 321. 
6. See infra note 18. 
7. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 413b (1996), which expressly limits covert actions to acrivities 
which the President finds are necessary to support U.S. foreign policy. 
8. By the 1990s, the numbers of nation-States had again dramatically increased, numbering 
in excess of 180. 
9. The Church Committee also defined covert action as "~landestine activity designed to 
influence foreign governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy 
conducted in such a way that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not apparent." FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 131. Today "clandestine" refers more precisely to actions not intended 
to be known at all or ones ascribed to other actors. 
10. See generally JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENT'S SECRET WARS (1986). 
11. Plausible deniability became a household phrase with Iran-Contra, but it did not 
originate then. The term was evolutionary. The Church Committee noted that the term had 
been used to shield the President from knowledge-placing the onus for covert action on 
subordinates. Current legislative history clearly shows that Congress intends that the President 
be unable to use it to avoid accountability to Congress. . 
12. But cf. KNorr, supra note 2. Knott's excellent treatise on covert operations documents 
early use by presidents, but, as with intelligence, no expertise ever really developed until World 
\Var II, and no singular responsibility for covert operations was assigned until even later. 
13. HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS 658-659 (1979). 
14. President Harry Truman discovered the essential dilemma early. Covert actions required 
oversight, but he knew that he could not plausibly deny activities too openly discussed at official 
councils. His solution, in an era of "containment" foreign policy, was to have covert action 
worked out of a special panel in which he did not participate. See PRADOS, supra note 10, at 79. 
President Dwight Eisenhower, who criticized the Truman foreign policy of containment, quickly 
learned that the problems of control versus security and plausible deniability were colossal. He, 
too, came to rely on a special group to run covert operations. By then, however, covert 
operations had grown so rapidly that secret oversight was more a wish than a reality. See id. at 
144-148. 
15. 1975 testimony of former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, cited in FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 141. 
16. Possibly to capture attention, this scrutiny focused initially on assassination before 
moving to a concentrated focus on the intelligence community and the FBI. See generally AN 
INTERIM REpORT OF THE SELECf COMMITIEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
WITH REsPECf TO INTELLIGENCE AcrrvmES, Rep. No. 94-465 (1975). The Committee 
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denounced ill-advised assassination plots, but not assassination itself. Not until President Jimmy 
Carter banned the technique by Executive Order did it cease to be a potential arrow in the 
national security quiver. 
17. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 153. The language has been slightly modified by 
subsequent legislation. It now requires that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
"perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as 
the President or the Narional Security Council may direct." 50 U.S.C. §403-3 (d) (5). 
18. E.g., NSC-4-A authorized covert psychological operations and NSC 10/2 authorized 
covert polirical and paramilitary operations. Both were directed primarily at the Soviet Union, 
but, of course. containment policy meant they were geographically unfocused. 
19. FINAL REpORT, supra note 1, at 145. 
20. For a brief description of this process, see John B. Chomeau, Covert Action's Proper Role in 
U.S. Policy, INT'LJ. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Fall 1988. at 407,410-411. 
See also PRADOS, supra note 10, at 110-111. 
21. CONGo REC. S. 5292 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 1956) cited in FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 149. 
22. See FINAL REpORT, supra note 1, at 153. 
23. The Church Committee noted that covert activities mounted into the hundreds in each 
of the administrations of Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson. 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. 
24. 22 Pub. L. 93-559, 50 U.S.C. §2422 (1974). President Gerald Ford personally opposed 
the personal certification requirement in his recommendations on the legislation. See FINAL 
REpORT, supra note 1 at 58, n. 26. 
25. Pub. L. No. 97-377, §793, 46 Stat. 1865 (1982). 
26. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984). See also Pub. L. No. 99-591 
(Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1987) §9037, 100 Stat. 3341-108; §9045, 100 
Stat. 3341-109 (1986). 
27. REpORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR WITH THE MINORITY VIEW 48-52 (Brinkley and Engelberg eds., 1988). The National 
Security Council was, and is, a policy-advising body, not an "agency or entity involved in 
intelligence activities." 
28. Compare Christopher C. Joyner & Michael A. Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: 
Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621 (1985), with John 
N. Moore, The Secret War in Central American and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 
43 (1986). 
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4. 
30. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 4, § 1.8(e). 
31. See HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMs TRANSACTIONS WITH 
IRAN AND SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE 
NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REpORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING 
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REp. NO. 216, H.R. REp. NO. 433, at3-11 (1987). 
32. E.g., a covert operation in support of Afghanistan guerilla resistance to the 1979 Soviet 
invasion remains a source of criticism. In 1997 the United States was still trying to recover 
Stinger anti-aircraft missiles originally destined to oppose Soviet aircraft but today potentially in 
the hands of terrorists. 
33. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(3); see note 43 infra. 
34. See, e.g., MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE: THE SECRETW AR BETWEEN THE FBI AND CIA 151 
(1994). 
35. 50US.C. §413b(a). 
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36. Id., §413b(b). 
37. The dissemination of nonattributable information or communications designed to affect 
the conditions under which governments act. The substance may be either true or false, or some 
combination of each. 
38. This might consist of advice, money, or physical assistance, with a purpose to encourage 
desired activities or dissuade those considered hostile. 
39. Secret military assistance, usually in the form of training. 
40. E.g., security assistance and intelligence training for the leadership of the "right" faction. 
41. Two respected authorities argue that the statute was intended to supersede the 
definition found in Exec. Order No. 12,333. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN and JAMES BAKER, 
REGULATING COVERT ACTION 123 (1992). The author respectfully disagrees with the breadth 
of that statement. Legislative history indicates that the intent was to regulate by procedure only a 
limited portion of the Order's concept of activities, not to displace legislatively its broad foreign 
policy scope. Reisman and Baker criticize the legislative definition as under-inclusive and write 
more approvingly of the definition in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. Virtually any definition 
wUI be subject to criticism as being either under or over-inclusive, but under-inclusion is 
consistent with the limited scope of oversight that Congress then thought appropriate. 
42. Covert action means an activity or activities of the United States Government to 
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of 
the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not 
include: 
(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional 
counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational 
security of United States Government programs, or administrative activities; 
(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities; 
(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law 
enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or 
(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities 
described in paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) of other United States Government agencies abroad. 
50 U.S.C § 413b(3). 
43. S. REp. No. 85, at 42 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 193, 236. Some view this 
language to indicate that Congress meant to treat all Executive actions intended to remain 
secret as covert action. This writer believes that view is grossly over-inclusive. Like the issue of 
unintended consequences, this is a subject deserving of a stand-alone analysis. 
44. An even more difficult question is whether any Executive action that is intended to 
remain secret invokes the statute. Despite the statutory language and its legislative history, this is 
an issue over which reasonable minds can differ and is, more properly, an issue for separate 
analysis. 
45. PRADOS, supra note 10, is a thoughtful study of paramilitary covert actions that, in large 
measure, reflects this concern. 
46. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment, for example, required the CIA to report all covert 
actions to eight congressional committees, four in each house. While it is difficult to argue 
against the propriety of Congress being in the "know," in practical terms this meant sixty 
members, plus staff, all newly exposed to facts, the mere intimation of which can cause a failure 
in foreign policy and, perhaps, the death of the actors. 
47. One historian, writing of General Washington's military espionage apparatus, 
concluded: "It was deemed good propaganda to impute clandestine methods only to the enemy, 
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thus implying that Britain was unscrupulous and had to use underhanded tactics to succeed." 
RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, AMERICAN EsPIONAGE: FROM SECRET SERVICE TO CIA 9 (1977). 
48. In Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1805), the Supreme Court limited the foreign policy 
powers of the President because the Congress had chosen to speak. During a period of hostilities 
with France, and acting on Presidential orders, the U.S. Navy seized a ship departing a French 
port. Congress, however, had enacted legislation to halt the intercourse with France which 
authorized seizure of ships sailing to a French port. Speaking for the Court, Chief justice 
Marshall opined that the President's orders would undoubtedly have been lawful had not 
Congress legislated differently. 
49. To illustrate, two covert actions usually cited as successes were Operations "Ajax" in 
Iran (placing the Shah in power) and "Success" in Guatemala (displacement of President 
Arbenz). Both were short-term gains, and neither materially affected the balance of power in the 
Cold War; yet a failure in either might well have forced those nations into the Soviet camp. The 
truth is that national interest suffers if a covert action fails, particularly so ifit is the more visible 
paramilitary action. While it is impossible to know the real history of all covert actions, covert 
paramilitary actions do not have a gleaming record of success. 
50. See e.g., Mitrovic, Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States, in PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION 219 (Milan 
Sahovic ed., 1972). 
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